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Counting animals in war: First steps towards an inclusive just-war theory
Josh Milburn and Sara Van Goozen
Abstract
War is harmful to animals, but few have considered how such harm should
affect assessments of the justice of military actions. In this paper, we propose
a  way  in  which  concern  for  animals  can  be  included  within  the  just-war
framework,  with  a  focus  on  necessity and  proportionality.  We  argue  that
counting animals in war will not make just-war theory excessively demanding,
but it will make just-war theory more humane. By showing how animals can
be included in our proportionality  and necessity assessments,  we provide a
crucial first step towards developing an animal-inclusive account of just-war
theory.
Keywords
Animal  rights;  animal  ethics;  just-war  theory;  warfare;  proportionality;
necessity.
1: Introduction
Although soldiers no longer ride into battle on horseback, war is very bad for animals. Like
the horses, some animals are used in military activities, such as the dogs used to help guard
bases or to sniff out mines. Some animals are used in military research and development
(R&D) and training, such as the pigs used to test weaponry and train medics.1 An awareness
1 For how animals are, were, and could be used in warfare, see the contributions to Salter, Nocella, and Bentley
2013 and Hediger 2012.
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of the implications of war for animals is growing among animal activists and the general
public—though academics rarely consider the impact of war on animals (Salter 2013: 24–25).
Another  group of animals  impacted  by warfare are its  incidental  victims.  Writing
during the Bosnian War in October 1992, John F. Burns reports that only a single animal
remained alive in Sarajevo’s zoo after the city had been under siege for four months:
The scene in the animal house is wrenching.  A putrid odor pervades the concrete
building, and cage after cage is littered with the carcasses of lions, tigers, leopards and
pumas. From the skeletal  remains of some and the whole carcasses of others, it is
clear that some died sooner than others, and that their  surviving mates fed on the
bodies before they, too, succumbed to hunger. … In the cage where there were once
four bears, the sole survivor prowls amid the jawbones and rib cages and tufted skins
of the others. The big cats and bears and wolves lasted longer than the giraffe, the
ponies and the buffaloes, which were in paddocks exposed to Serbian positions when
the siege set in. By midsummer, they were dead, shot out of pity, perhaps, or maybe
for target practice. (Burns 1992; cf. Kinder 2012)
The harms of war to caged or domesticated animals,  however, are surely dwarfed by the
harms to free-living (hereafter,  wild) animals. Guy Smallman, in  The War You Don’t See,
recalls being the first Westerner to arrive after a US bombing in Afghanistan. He said that
“The first  thing  that  struck me when I  was going in  there was the  silence.  The Afghan
countryside is usually a symphony of birdsong. And it was absolutely dead quiet…” (quoted
in Salter 2013: 25, emphasis Salter’s).
Though emotive, these anecdotes do nothing to reveal the scale of the impact of war
on animals. One can find some indication of this in the empirical literature in conservation
2
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biology and (so-called) warfare ecology. However, this work offers only a partial image, for
at least three reasons. First, data about the impact of warfare can be hard to come by or is
incomplete;  conflict  zones present a range of serious challenges for the researcher,  while
conflict-related data can be shrouded in secrecy and misinformation. Second, conservationists
and ecologists are generally concerned with the success of species and ecosystems, and not
the success of individual animals. Though these can go hand-in-hand, they do not always do
so.  And  third,  conservationists  and  ecologists  focus  on  particular  kinds  of  animals.  The
impact of conflict on populations of charismatic megafauna is at least partially documented,
but the impact on animals of less revered species and on domesticated animals may go little
mentioned.
The empirical data suggests that warfare and military activity can have both positive
and negative impacts on wild animals, but that, overall, the negative far outweigh the positive
(Daskin and Pringle 2018; Dudley et al. 2002; Gaynor et al. 2016; Hanson 2018). In a 2016
review, twenty four pathways by which armed conflict impacts wildlife were identified. Of
these,  five  were  positive,  nineteen  negative;  and  ten  were  “tactical”  (six  military,  four
auxiliary), with fourteen “non-tactical.” Let us take the negative military tactical impacts as
examples. Wildlife are impacted by mines, bombs, and chemicals, as were Rwanda’s gorillas
and Angola’s elephants during and in the wake of these countries’ respective civil wars; by
the use of environmental  destruction as a war tactic,  as were the animals  living in areas
defoliated by American forces in Vietnam or Turkish forces in Tunceli Province; by the fact
that  protected  areas  are  used  as  a  staging  ground  (including  Mozambique’s  Gorongosa
National Park and El Salvador’s forests); and by an increase in arms availability: Ethiopia’s
civil war, for example, led to a proliferation of firearms and, consequently, a militarisation of
hunting (Gaynor et al. 2016: 534–535).
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Reviews  of  this  literature  call  attention  to  documented  negative  conservation
consequences  for  favoured  species—typically  large  mammals—in  conflict  zones  (e.g.,
Dudley  et  al.  2002:  322–323;  Hanson  2018:  54).  For  instance,  there  is  the  decline  of
elephants in Uganda and the DRC, and the increase of poaching of primates in the DRC and
in  Rwanda in  response  to  these  various  countries’  civil  wars  (Dudley  et  al.  2002:  322).
Particularly  troubling  for  conservationists  is  the  fact  that  conflict  zones  very  frequently
coincide  with so-called  biodiversity  hotspots;  some 80% of  major  armed conflicts  in  the
second half of the last century took place in hotspots, even though these make up only 2.3%
of the Earth’s land surface (Hanson et al. 2009). Hotspots are typically rich in vertebrate life,
and conflict can seriously adversely affect these animals. A study of African protected areas
found that the occurrence of armed conflict was the strongest predictor of a drop in large-
mammal population sizes between 1946 and 2010 (Daskin and Pringle 2018). Though, to
repeat, population size is not the primary concern for animal ethicists—who are concerned
with the fates of particular individual animals—this empirical work points to the depth and
breadth of the negative impact of war on nonhuman beings.
The  scholarship  on  warfare  and  animals  in  (critical)  animal  studies  and  on
ecology/conservation of animals in warfare has had relatively little impact on scholars of just-
war theory. Despite the occasional nod towards ecological damage as something that needs to
be  taken  seriously  in  assessments  of  the  justice  of  military  action  (e.g.,  Clifford  2012;
Drucker 1989; Eckersley 2007), harms to animals go basically unmentioned. For example,
Stones and Lives—a 2018 conference exploring “non-human value in war”—asked 
how we ought  to  compare  harms  to  human  beings  to  damage  to  objects  (or  the
environment), how we ought to distribute resources between protecting humans and
protecting  objects,  whether  one  may  intentionally  harm  humans  for  the  sake  of
4
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protecting non-human values, how we ought to restore heritage in the aftermath of
conflict, and how we ought to compensate for damage to heritage sites.2
Here, then, we see theorists seeking to explore the impact of war beyond humanity. But these
theorists  choose  to  focus  on  landscapes,  artefacts,  and  the  environment—not  animals.
Similarly, the twenty eight principles drawn up by the UN’s International Law Commission
about environmental protection in war do not even include the word  animal (International
Law Commission 2019; cf. Durant and Brito 2019). For both militaries and just-war theorists,
animals  “are  ‘collateral  damage’  in  the  most  invisible  sense  of  that  euphemism”
(Andrzejewski  2013:  74).  To  our  knowledge,  no  one  has  argued  that  theorists  ought  to
consider  harm  to  animals  when  weighing  the  justice  of  military  actions.  Animals  are
completely absent from the work of many major contemporary just-war theorists, such as
Michael Walzer and Jeff McMahan,3 and only mentioned in passing by others. For example,
the  possibility  of  counting  animals  in  war  is  acknowledged in a  prescient  footnote  from
Cécile Fabre:
My cosmopolitan account of the just war is human-centric. Perhaps that is an arbitrary
restriction—perhaps we should include non-human animals in our global community.
This might in turn have far-reaching implications for our understanding of the just
war. In particular, we would need to work out whether … to include the bads accruing
to non-human  animals as a result of the war in our proportionality calculus … My
intuitions on those questions are far too rough at this point to be worth setting out here
2 See http://stockholmcentre.org/event/workshop-proportionality-and-non-human-value/.
3 This is particularly surprising, given that animal ethics and just-war theory are mainstays of analytic moral and
political philosophy—and even more so given that they share some leading figures. For example, McMahan has
written works of great importance in both literatures, but has never addressed them together.
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—hence the restricted scope in that respect of the present inquiry. (Fabre 2012: 7, fn.
9)
In this paper, we will  take up the question proposed by Fabre regarding the inclusion of
animals. Our focus will be on the requirements of proportionality and necessity. Both of these
requirements apply to jus ad bellum (considerations relating to the just resort to war) and jus
in bello  (considerations relating to right conduct in war).  Proportionality requires that the
harm caused by a war, or a particular action within a war, must be proportionate to the good it
achieves. Necessity requires that there must be no less harmful (feasible) means of achieving
the same good ends than the proposed war or particular action within a war.
Of  course,  proportionality  and  necessity  are  only  two  of  the  requirements  to  be
considered when assessing the justice of military action. In order to develop a full account of
an  animal-inclusive  just-war  theory,  we  would  also  need  to  consider  the  other  just-war
requirements,  such  as  just  cause (acceptable  justifications  for  going  to  war),  legitimate
authority (who may wage war),  discrimination (who may be targeted in war), and so on.
Taken together, these just-war criteria establish a) when resort to war may be justified, b)
who may legitimately wage war, c) who may be harmed (deliberately or otherwise) in war,
and d) what kinds and how much harm may be caused, intentionally or unintentionally, in
pursuit of victory.
Some work has already been done to address the inclusion of animals in relation to
those first three concerns. So for example, the question of whether war on behalf of animals
could be justified, and who would be able to legitimately fight such a war, has been alluded
to  by  several  animal  ethicists  (Bernstein  2004;  Best  2006;  Cochrane  and  Cooke  2016;
Cochrane 2018, chap. 5; Hadley 2009)—though it is a topic, we think, avoided by many out
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of a desire to stay away from controversial questions about violence on behalf of animals.4
Karsten Nowrot (2015, cf. Alger and Alger 2012), meanwhile, explores the issue of animal
“combatants,” suggesting that animals should be part of the moral discussion relating to who
may be (deliberately) harmed in war. The final issue, however—the question of what kinds
of, and how much, harm to animals may permissibly be caused in pursuit of victory—has
received  little  (if  any)  attention.  Yet  wars  cause  very  significant  foreseen-but-unintended
harm to animals. As such, addressing this has a degree of urgency, providing us with genuine
opportunities to alleviate real-world death and suffering of animals. Given that animals are
rarely the intended targets of harm in war, and war on behalf of animals has never been a
serious possibility, addressing the unintended-but-foreseen harm caused to animals should be
the first concern of anyone interested in making just-war theory more inclusive. The necessity
and  proportionality  requirements  are  the  just-war  requirements  that  directly  address  how
much harm may be caused in war, and so it is these requirements that we will address in this
paper. As we will show, including animals in considerations of necessity and proportionality
offers a practical way of considering animals in real-world warfare without making just-war
theory wholly impractical.
In light of this paper’s aim, we will also make the further restriction of focusing on
including  animals  in  our  assessment  of  specific wars  and  military  activities.  The  very
existence  of  standing  armies  raises  important  questions  of  proportionality  and  harms  to
animals—with  regards  to,  for  instance,  militaries’  carbon  footprint,  and  soldiers’
consumption of animals. While we welcome critiques of the use of animals in the “military-
animal industrial complex” (Salter 2013)—and support practical steps to make the military
more humane5—this is a separate question to the one we are presently addressing. Questions
4 The Oxford  Centre  for  Animal  Ethics  and  its  journal—The Journal  of  Animal  Ethics—explicitly  oppose
violence on behalf of animals. The organisation’s fellows are not permitted to advocate for it, and comments in
favour of it are banned from the journal.
5 For instance,  Finland has taken steps  towards plant-based meals for soldiers  (Rosendahl  2018).  This was
motivated by environmental concerns, but indicates what could be done.
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of proportionality  and necessity  of particular  activities,  therefore,  do not need to become
entangled with these other issues. The argument will proceed as follows. §2 introduces the
requirements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and explains the proportionality and necessity
requirements. §3 presents our proposal for including harm to animals in proportionality and
necessity assessments, and §§4–5 discuss and reject the worry that harm to animals should
not be included in proportionality and necessity calculations as it would make just war too
demanding.  While  animal-sensitive  accounts  of  proportionality  and necessity  will  not  be
overly  demanding,  they  will  have  a  practical  impact.  This  will  be  shown in  §6,  which
considers our proposal’s implications with three case studies. 
2: Proportionality and necessity ad bellum and in bello
Just-war theory comprises at least two sets of criteria.6 The  jus ad bellum criteria specify
when resort to war is justified, and the jus in bello criteria specify just behaviour in war. The
most  widely  recognised  ad  bellum criteria  include  the  requirements  of  1)  just  cause,  2)
legitimate authority, 3) right intention, 4) reasonable prospects of success, 5) last resort, and
6)  proportionality  (Johnson 1999;  Walzer  2006).  The  in  bello requirements  are  typically
considered to be 1) discrimination, 2) necessity, and 3) proportionality (Hurka 2005; Walzer
2006).
Offering detailed explanations of each criterion will take us too far from our present
enquiry,  but  a  brief  comment  will  be useful.  As noted above,  taken together,  the  jus ad
bellum and jus in bello criteria provide us with answers to the questions of when war might
be  justified  (the  requirements  of  just  cause,  right  intention,  and  reasonable  prospect  of
success),  who  may  wage  war  (the  requirement  of  legitimate  authority),  who  may  be
deliberately harmed in war (the requirement of discrimination), and how much harm may be
6 We set aside any criteria concerning jus post bellum (“justice after war”).
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caused in war (the requirements of proportionality, necessity, and last resort—which is the ad
bellum version of the necessity requirement).
In order for a war to be fully just, it needs to satisfy all the requirements.7 On the other
hand, according to both international law and what is sometimes referred to as “orthodox”
just-war theory,  individual  combatants  and commanders only need to concern themselves
with considerations of jus in bello. In other words, unjust and just combatants alike can fight
justly  so  long  as  they  adhere  to  the  principles  of  jus  in  bello.8 Our  argument  concerns
proportionality and necessity both  ad bellum and  in bello. These requirements are the ones
that most explicitly require us to consider the unintended-but-foreseen effects of war:9 Ad
bellum, proportionality and necessity (the latter of which is, to repeat, captured in the idea of
“last resort”) address the (expected) overall harm caused by a war—in bello, they address the
(expected)  harm  caused  by  particular  military  actions.  We  consider  necessity  and
proportionality both ad bellum and in bello because the operation of the criteria is not sharply
different  when considered  in war  than  when  considered  prior  to  war.  The  same factors
(expected good effects, expected negative effects, probability of effects occurring, etc.) need
to be considered in both situations—and our examples will concern both  ad bellum and  in
bello decision-making.
7 For example, a war that meets the ad bellum requirements but is not conducted according to the principles of
jus in bello is not a just war. Neither is a war that initially meets the ad bellum requirements, but changes over
time: for instance, a war initially intended to repel an invasion could turn into a war of conquest.
8 For the canonical expression of “orthodox” just-war theory, see Walzer (2006). However, in contemporary
scholarship, a split between orthodox and revisionist just-war theory has developed. Revisionists tend to argue
that—since they are fighting to achieve an unjust cause—it is impossible for an unjust combatant’s actions to
meet  the  in  bello proportionality  and  necessity  requirements,  because  their  actions  do  not  have  good
consequences  (see,  e.g.,  McMahan  2009;  Fabre  2012).  Moreover,  they  tend  to  reject  the  claim  that  it  is
permissible for unjust combatants to kill just combatants, since the latter are morally innocent to the extent that
they  are  fighting  in  (collective)  self-defence.  On  the  revisionist  approach,  then,  it  would  seem practically
impossible for unjust combatants to fight in accordance with jus in bello. In this paper, we do not take a side in
this debate. Revisionist and orthodox just-war theory, we suggest, can—and should—consider the effect of (just
or unjust) combatants’ actions on animals. For those with revisionist leanings, whenever we discuss  in bello
examples below, assume that the war was ad bellum just.
9 Jeff McMahan and others distinguish between  narrow  and  wide  proportionality (McMahan 2009). Narrow
proportionality concerns harm done to those liable to suffer harm, such as culpable aggressors, whereas wide
proportionality concerns harm done to those not liable to suffer harm, such as innocent bystanders. Although
issues of narrow proportionality do arise in war—it is possible to inflict disproportionate harm on soldiers—
since  combatants  are  generally  liable  to  be  targeted,  it  is  primarily  wide  proportionality  that  should  be
considered when assessing the justice of military action. Similar can be said about necessity, mutatis mutandis.
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Before we can proceed, we need to be clear about what these requirements entail—
which  is  not  straightforward.  Take,  first,  proportionality.  Both  ad  bellum and  in  bello,
proportionality requires that the harmful consequences of a military action do not outweigh
the  harm  averted.  But  there  is  disagreement  as  to  whether  this  means  that  harmful
consequences must be less than good consequences, not exceed good consequences, or not be
much  greater  than good  consequences  (Hurka  2005).  The  key  question  here  is  about
weighting. Do we weigh (likely) good effects the same as (likely) bad effects, or could we
give  good  effects  more  weight?  The  latter  means  that  (action  in)  war  could  still  be
proportionate when causing more harm than good. 
There is also the question of which effects count. As Thomas Hurka argues, a view of
proportionality that counts all good effects of a war is implausible. Rather, the relevant good
effects are only those arising from the avoidance of the harms that give a war its just cause.
Incidental good effects (e.g., boosting the economy) do not count (Hurka 2005: 40–45). On
the other hand, all bad effects caused by the war should be considered in our proportionality
calculation (Hurka 2005: 45–46). But although the relevant bad effects are not restricted in
terms of content, the introduction of another agent’s wrongful choice in the causal chain may
reduce the weight we should give the bad effect in our calculations (Hurka 2005: 47). In
addition,  it may be the case that different weights are ascribed to harms to friendlies and
enemies, including non-combatants.10
10 For instance, Hurka (2005) suggests that it is permissible to somewhat discount foreseen harm to enemy non-
combatants  compared to harm to friendly or neutral  non-combatants.  This means that  when faced  with the
choice between foreseeably harming 100 friendly non-combatants and foreseeably harming 200 enemy non-
combatants, it is permissible to pursue the latter course of action (see also Abbate 2014; Kamm 2005; Bazargan-
Forward 2018). However, there is no widespread agreement on to what extent, if at all, enemy non-combatant
lives can be discounted (for the argument that there is no such general permission to discount harm to enemy
non-combatants, see, for instance, McMahan 2010 and Van Goozen 2018). It is generally held that harm to
combatants can be discounted compared to harm to non-combatants (enemy or friendly); however, even here
there is some disagreement.  For instance, in the case of a “supreme emergency”, Walzer (2006) suggests it
might be permissible to override the principle of distinction and target civilians directly. This may be understood
as the claim that in such situations it is permissible to absolutely prioritise friendly lives, whether they are non-
combatants or combatants.
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Let us now turn to necessity, which is generally considered to require that we select
the least harmful method of achieving our aim (e.g., the resolution of the conflict through
military victory). Thus, ad bellum, a war is unnecessary if other, less harmful but nonetheless
feasible, means to resolve the conflict have not been tried (in other words, if the war is not the
last resort).  In bello, an action is unnecessary if less harmful (but feasible) tactics have not
been tried. Daniel Statman offers a fairly conventional definition, which serves for present
purposes:
[the] necessity condition concerns the relation between some defensive act, D, and all
alternative defensive acts D1, D2… Dn. It requires that D be less harmful than all
these alternative acts… Whatever [a threat’s] nature and magnitude, [the victim] is
required to take the least harmful measure to block it. (2011: 436–437)11
So, both necessity and proportionality require us to consider possible harmful consequences.
The key difference between them is the point of comparison. For proportionality, we compare
our proposed course of action  to doing nothing;  for necessity,  we compare our proposed
course of action to alternative courses of action. Thus, any particular action can be necessary
but not proportionate, and  vice versa. However—given that both require us to consider the
(intended and unintended) harmful consequences of our actions—including harm to animals
in  our  judgments  concerning  either  one  of  necessity  or  proportionality  will  affect  our
understanding of the other.
Determining  whether  military  action  meets  the  proportionality  and  necessity
requirements is, thus, not straightforward, both because of the difficulty of the calculations
11 However, some argue for a more nuanced version, which enables us to consider factors such as the likelihood
of success of the different options, as well as whether some or all of the prospective victims of harm are liable to
(some) harm (e.g., Lazar 2012; McMahan 2018). What none of these more nuanced approaches deny, however,
is that necessity requires us to compare different potential courses of action and select the one that is, by some
standard or other, the least harmful—the morally best defensive option (McMahan 2018: 436–437).
11
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involved,  which  necessarily  deal  with  probabilities  and  uncertainty,12 and  because  of
theoretical  disagreements  about  what  they  entail.  Nevertheless,  we hold  that  all  just-war
theorists, regardless of their specific views on necessity and proportionality, have reason to
count animals in war. That said, let us now turn directly to their inclusion.
3: Counting animals’ interests
Counting animals in war means, first, considering the interests that animals have and, second,
taking them into account when weighing the costs of military activities. Such “activities”
range from the declaration of war to individual soldiers’ missions. By an animal having an
interest in x, we mean simply that denying the animal x will have an adverse impact upon her
wellbeing—it will make things go worse for her. Though the language of animal interests has
traditionally  been  associated  with  utilitarian  approaches,  some  approaches  will  consider
interests in order to calculate the rights that animals possess. These approaches have recently
become very popular.13 We do not, however,  need to talk about animal rights in order to
consider animals’ interests in our judgements of proportionality and necessity.
All sentient animals (animals able to experience pleasure and pain) possess at least
some  interests,  and  these  interests  may  be  sufficiently  strong  to  tip  the  scales  in
proportionality or necessity calculations. There are tricky questions to be asked about how to
calculate  what  interests  an  animal  has,  and  how strong  they  are,  but—in  the  abstract—
counting animals’ interests is no more mysterious than counting humans’ interests.
12 Proportionality  in  the  context  of  war  is  sometimes  confused  with  a  retributive  or  backward-looking
proportionality principle (Hurka 2005: 59; McMahan 2017). Proportionality in war asks whether harm averted
exceeds harm caused. In other words, the question is not whether A causes more harm than B has previously
done, but whether A causes more harm than B would have done if A did not act. This means that assessments of
proportionality are necessarily uncertain. Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to necessity.
13 Tony Milligan (2015) identifies them as a near-defining feature of the recent “political turn” in animal ethics.
Alasdair Cochrane (2012) offers a particularly comprehensive account, and has begun to explore just-war theory
and animals (Cochrane and Cooke 2016; Cochrane 2018: chap. 5). He has also observed that Sue Donaldson
and  Will  Kymlicka  have  arguments  that  ultimately  lead  to  the  need  for  “a  just  war  theory  for  animals”
(Cochrane 2013: 139). Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) offer  the most influential  recent account of animal
rights. Though they are less explicit about this than others, their account is interest-based (see 2011: 264–265;
2013: 151), and they are the writers credited by Fabre (2012: 7) as pushing her to think about animals and
warfare.
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3.1: What interests do animals have?
We can identify four crucial interests possessed by sentient animals. The first is an interest in
not suffering. There is a sense in which it may be simply true  a priori that, all else equal,
suffering is bad for wellbeing: if anything lessens one’s wellbeing, we might think, suffering
does. Granted, there are empirical questions about which beings suffer, about the stimuli that
induce suffering in a being, and the extent to which these stimuli induce suffering (cf. Singer
2011: chap. 3). But we can be fairly sure that practically all sentient beings suffer when they
burn in firebombed scrub, or bleed when limbs are blown off by mines, or starve in defoliated
wastelands.
Some claim that animals have less of an interest in not suffering than human persons.
Loren Lomasky, for example, suggests that pigs have weaker interests than human persons as
the former may not have memories of pain that lead to unpleasant apprehensions of future
pain, and may not see such pain as an episode in the life of a continuing self (2013: 188–189).
Such  an  argument  might  well  backfire,  however,  when  one  considers  how  this
comprehension of oneself as an enduring entity can lessen the horror of suffering (Garner
2013: 126; Linzey 2009: 17–18). As Bernard Rollin observes, suffering beings with limited
psychological complexity lack the ability to understand that pain can end, and cannot look
back to a time before pain: “their entire universe is the pain, they can have no hope!” (2011:
431, emphasis Rollin’s). Judith Jarvis Thomson puts it well when she says that
other things being equal it is worse to cause an animal pain than to cause an adult
human being pain. An adult human being can, as it were, think his or her way around
the pain to what lies beyond it in the future; an animal—like a human baby—cannot
do this, so that there is nothing for the animal but the pain. (1990: 292–293)
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For our purposes, however, we will assume that the interest that an animal has in avoiding
pain is as strong as the interest possessed by a human in avoiding pain.
A second key interest is the other side of the first. Just as animals have an interest in
avoiding negative experiences—like suffering—so they have an interest in having access to
positive experiences. One, but not necessarily the only, such experience might be pleasure.
Warfare, in addition to making animals suffer, may cut off their opportunities to experience
positive things.
The second interest is particularly important because it provides the foundation of the
third: an interest in continued life. It would be odd to allow that animals have an interest in
avoiding suffering but not in avoiding death. This would suggest that, if we sought to protect
animals’ interests, the best thing to do would be to painlessly kill them all (Godlovitch 1971:
168;  McMahan  2002:  201;  McMahan  2008:  67).  The  straightforward  way  to  show how
continued life is good for an animal is to observe that continued life offers the chance for
positive experience, and death is bad for the animal because it removes this chance. This is a
deprivation account of the badness of death—death is bad because it deprives a being of good
things—and accounts like it have been prevalent in animal-rights theory (e.g., Abbate 2019;
DeGrazia 2002; Regan 2004).
There are at least three crucial senses in which a deprivation account may ground a
weaker interest in continued life for most animals than for paradigmatic humans (Cochrane
2012: 66–67). Humans typically have a further interest in life because, first, they can reflect
on future valuable experiences, bringing them present wellbeing; second, they have projects
and goals they wish to fulfil; and, third, they have a stronger psychological continuity with
their future selves than do animals.14 In short, we can refer to these differences by saying that
14 This final point relies upon a commitment to the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. This
is the idea that “the badness of death is proportional to the strength of the victim’s time-relative interest  in
continuing to live. The strength of his time-relative interest in continuing to live is a function of both the net
14
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many humans possess high degrees of personhood, while most sentient animals possess this,
if at all, to a much lower degree.
To  these  considerations  about  the  importance  of  personhood,  we  can  add  two
empirical observations about the lives of animals. First, animals may be incapable of the most
positive  experiences  open  to  many  humans:  The  highs  of  aesthetic  appreciation,  deep
interpersonal love and connection, and life-defining achievement are closed off to most (or
all) animals. Second, animals frequently live lives of hardship. Tens of billions of animals
live in intensive farms, for example. Such animals can expect short lives of stress and tedium
punctuated by flashes of satisfaction and pain, ending in a violent death. Wild animals, too,
can live very bad lives, afflicted by diseases, competition, starvation, and constant threats of
predation (Horta 2010). On this deprivation account of the badness of death for animals, then,
animals typically have a lower interest in continued life than do humans. But precisely how
much lower is going to depend on myriad contextual and empirical factors.15
The fourth key interest, which derives from the others, is in access to those things
necessary for subsistence. For wild animals, this can be framed as an interest in access to
their territories. Animals require access to food, water, shelter, air, and/or space. These things
afford them positive  experiences,  and, without  them, the  animals  will  suffer and die.  As
argued,  suffering  and  death  are  contrary  to  the  interests  of  animals,  while  positive
experiences  are  in  their  interests.  Derivatively,  then,  access  to  their  territories  is  in  the
animals’  interests  (Cooke 2017;  Hadley  2015).  This  is  important,  as  many of  the  harms
amount of good his life would contain if he were not to die, and the extent to which he would be bound to
himself in the future, if he were not to die, by the prudential unity relations” (McMahan 2002: 105–106). For
more, see McMahan 2002: passim, esp. §§1.5.2, 2.2.2, and 3.1.1–3.1.2.
15 Similar is going to be true on desire accounts, which ground animals’ interest (if any) in continued life on
their desires (see, e.g., DeGrazia 2002: 59–61; Garner 2013: 128–130). Such accounts—which we are not going
to  develop  here—may  have  different  results  for  the  development  of  an  animal-sensitive  just-war  theory.
Developing such an approach is a worthwhile endeavour for those sympathetic to desire accounts. There may be
other accounts of death’s badness for animals that hold that any interest-bearing being has an equal interest in
not dying. We are not going to explore such positions here, but we do note that they are going to have some
radical consequences when connected with an animal-sensitive account of just-war theory (compare §5.2). This
may be a reason to think twice about endorsing them.
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warfare imposes upon animals come not directly from injury caused by weapons, but from
the  impact  that  warfare  has  on  the  animals’  environment  (Andrzejewski  2013;
Ramanathapillai 2013). Domesticated animals, too, need food, air, water, shelter, and so on to
avoid suffering and death, but framing these interests in terms of access to territory likely
goes wrong. However, domesticated animals are clearly faced with death and suffering—and
loss of positive experiences—if their human caretakers are killed or flee due to war (Tyler
2013: 12-13). Just as an animal-sensitive account of just-war theory will consider the harms
to  wild  animals  resulting  from the  destruction  of  habitats,  it  will  consider  the  harms to
domesticated animals resulting from the removal of their caretakers.
 
3.2: Why count animals’ interests?
This gives us the start of a fairly straightforward how, but it does not give us a  why. Many
readers will share the intuition towards which Fabre (2012: 7, quoted above [§1]) points—
that  we  should  include  animals within  our  moral  community,  and  thus  just-war  theory.
However, we do not need to rely on a blunt appeal to intuition. If animals have interests and
their interests count,16 we can motivate animals’ inclusion in just-war theory using a form of
argument familiar to animal ethicists.17
Consider a first case of possible military action in which serious side-effect harm is
expected to accrue to a human civilian population. Our considered judgement in this case is
that we have a duty to take steps to minimise this harm where possible—perhaps by taking
different military action, or by taking no military action at all. Doing so would ensure, as far
as possible, that the vital interests of these civilians, such as their interests in continued life,
are met. Hence, just-war theory contains requirements of proportionality and necessity. But
imagine  a  second  case  of  possible  military  action  in  which  serious  side-effect  harm  is
16 We offer  no argument to those who believe that all  animals lack interests,  or that animals’ interests are
irrelevant, and doubt that many readers will hold these views.
17 This particular framing borrows from John Hadley (2006: 446), who deploys it in a different context.
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expected to accrue to an animal population. Like the civilians of the first case, animals face
risk of early death, which is contrary to their interests. By extension, then, we have a duty to
take steps to minimise this harm where possible. In both cases, interests will be adversely
affected,  and, in both cases, steps can be taken to minimise the setting-back of interests.
Hence, we propose that it is appropriate to say that questions of proportionality and necessity
apply to animals.
There may seem to be a fundamental difference between the first and the second case,
however, in that the humans in the first case have greater interests in continued life than the
animals in the second, as explained in §3.1. But we deny that the interests the animals possess
are sufficiently weak that they should be ignored. To support this, we observe that there are
certain  humans  with  a  similarly  weaker  interest  in  continued  life,  due  to  their  lack  of
personhood. Thus, they lack those things that make the interests of the civilians (specifically,
their interests in remaining alive) in the first case stronger than the interests of the animals
(specifically,  their  interests  in remaining alive)  in  the second case.  Such humans include
many severely cognitively impaired individuals. For the sake of argument, let us assume a
third possible military action, which likely entails serious harm to a population of humans
with severe cognitive impairment. Our considered judgement in this case is that we would
have a duty to take steps to minimise such harm where possible, just as in the first case.
Further,  we take it  that  the  majority  of  just-war  theorists  agree  that  humans with severe
cognitive  disabilities,  like  paradigmatic  humans,  must  be  considered  in  calculations  of
proportionality and necessity.
But  if  the  victims  in  the  third  case  must  be  considered,  even  when  the  interests
concerned are weaker than those in the first case, the fact that the interests in the second case
are weaker than those in the first is not a compelling argument for not considering them.
Consistency demands that the interests in the second case are considered in proportionality
17
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and necessity calculations. To affirm that these interests are too weak to consider would have
unacceptable consequences for the third case.
Why hold that human and animal interests are comparable? On a conceptual level, it
is difficult to see why we should hold that there is an in-principle difference between them
without  resorting  to  speciesism—the  valorisation  of  members  of  a  particular  species,
analogous to the way that racists valorise members of a particular race. In any case, there are
some intuitively troubling consequences to such an approach. Imagine a worker at a remote
research station about to receive a painful but ultimately undamaging electric shock from an
exposed wire. The only way that an engineer can prevent this is to briefly shut off power by
redirecting the supply through a flooded field, electrocuting and killing a herd of wild horses.
Intuitively, the killing of these horses is deeply disproportionate. Due to the conceptual and
intuitive  problems with such a view,  we contend that  there  is  no prospect  of  reasonable
disagreement  about  whether animal  harm  could  outweigh  human  harm.  Reasonable
disagreement is going to be about how to weigh particular human and animal harms—and in
the next section, we offer our particular proposal. 
3.3: The positive proposal
It is worth separating two goals of this paper. The first is to argue that animals should be
included in just-war theory. The second is to offer a positive proposal for that inclusion. It is
worth acknowledging that one could, in principle, accept that animals should be included in
just-war theory, but object to our particular proposal. Nonetheless, we believe our proposal a
sensible response to close consideration of the normative salience of differences  between
humans and animals.
We hold that equal interests should be considered equally—and that unequal interests
should be considered unequally. This means that a human’s interest in continued life should
18
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normally outweigh an animal’s interest in continued life—likely,  multiple animals’ interests
in continued life—because the strength of a paradigmatic human’s interest in continued life is
greater than the strength of an animal’s, as explored in §3.1. Note that this is not the same
thing as saying that animals’ interests count for less—equal interests, we believe, should not
count for less. So, a human interest in not suffering should typically not outweigh an animal’s
interest in not suffering—and certainly not multiple animals’ interests—assuming the same
amount of suffering. This is because, as was explored in §3.1, we have no reason to believe
that animals’ interests in not suffering are weaker than humans’.
Thus, we hold that animal interests of equal strength to human interests should be
treated as equally significant unless there is some morally salient difference between them.
We have already suggested that animals’ species membership is not a compelling reason to
completely ignore their interests, and we now add that we hold that species membership is not
a compelling reason to partially discount animals’ interests relative to human interests. It is
not  our claim,  for  example,  that  when a human and an animal  could both be negatively
impacted by an action that the negative impact on the human is weightier  because she is a
human. It may, of course, be weightier because the negative impact on the human’s welfare is
greater  than  the  negative  impact  on  the  animal’s  welfare—though  that  is  a  completely
different claim.
Drawing upon the existing work on proportionality  and necessity discussed in §2,
however, we allow that there may be other relevant considerations. For example, depending
on  the  particular  vision  of  proportionality  favoured,  a  military  might fairly  discount  the
interests of wild animals relative to the interests of some humans because said wild animals
(unlike  said  humans)  are  not  members  of  “their”  community—just  as  they  might  fairly
discount  the  interests  of  enemy  citizens  relative  to  the  interests  of  their  own  citizens.
Alternatively, a military might fairly discount the interests of enemy soldiers relative to the
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interests of animals as the animals’ interests (unlike those of enemy soldiers) are the interests
of innocent non-combatants.  All of this  depends on the particular view of proportionality
favoured—and, in the interests of parsimony, we here remain neutral on this point.
4: A demandingness objection to counting animals in war
As argued  in  §3,  on  a  theoretical  level,  counting  animals  in  war  need  not  be  difficult.
However, as discussed in §2, determining proportionality and necessity is already complex.
For instance, in order to determine the proportionality of a war, we need to consider a whole
range of—more and less—likely negative effects, whose weights furthermore (may) need to
be mediated according to others’ intervening agency. By introducing a further factor into
these  calculations,  one  might  object,  we  are  making  it  more  difficult  to  satisfy  these
requirements.18 This gives rise to a demandingness objection to counting animals in war:
Inclusion makes fighting justly too difficult, and thus should be rejected.
To illustrate, consider a counterinsurgency scenario in which combatants are tasked
with killing an insurgent in a remote compound. They have reliable intelligence that there are
no (human) non-combatants present. On anthropocentric understandings of proportionality
and necessity, it could be permissible to attack the compound using artillery or an air-strike.
If the combatants are required to count animals, however, they would need to calculate the
number of animals at the location. Insurgents may have guard or pack animals; they may
keep farmed animals for food; or may simply be surrounded by wildlife. If the number of
animals is likely to be large, proportionality and necessity would, it might be pressed, require
that the combatants find a highly discriminative way to kill the insurgent, or refrain from
attacking. If killing the insurgent is an important war aim, they will be drawn to the first
option. However, killing the insurgent without harming the animals is likely to require the
combatants to enter the compound on foot. As such attacks are risky, the combatants may
18 Though we do not want to attribute this view to her, Fabre’s words quoted in §1 above may hint at this worry.
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therefore be required to risk  their lives, and the success of the mission, to avoid harming
animals. An account of proportionality requiring this would be very demanding—perhaps, a
critic might say, to the point of absurdity.19
This  demandingness  objection  goes  further.  The  demandingness  is  not  merely
practical,  as explored above. It also has an  epistemic element.20 Counting animals in war
requires a great deal of knowledge to which military personnel do not presently have access.
This includes the number of animals present in particular areas, what will harm these animals,
and the extent to which these animals may be harmed. Some of this, such as the psychological
complexity of an animal, needed to calculate the harm of her death, may be disputed among
experts.  So,  not  only  do  military  commanders  not  have this  information,  but  it  is  not
information that could be easily acquired—or so goes the objection.
Before we respond to these demandingness objections, we acknowledge that whether
this demandingness is problematic is up for debate. Intersectional scholars of critical animal
studies and critical peace studies, for example (e.g., Nocella, Salter, and Bentley 2013), might
welcome the implication that combatants will be significantly restricted in what they can do
and  that  many  (or  all)  wars  will  be  unjust.  However,  our  aim  is  to  show  that  this
demandingness  objection  fails  not because  the  demandingness  should  be  embraced,  but
because incorporating sensitivity to harm to animals into just-war theory—though requiring
changes—need not  make just  combat  prohibitively  difficult.  In  so doing,  we will  further
expand what it means (and does not mean) to count animals in war.
5: Taking the sting out of the demandingness objection
19 If the combatants have drones, they could order a drone-strike, which might enable them to kill the insurgent
without causing unnecessary harm to animals. This would, on the account we are proposing, be preferable, and
probably the best solution to the dilemma. This may therefore be an argument for the use of drones—i.e., to
make  military  actions  more  proportionate,  in  terms  of  harm  to  both  non-combatant  humans  and  animals.
Compare §§6.2–6.3.
20 We thank Gabriele Badano and an anonymous reviewer for this journal for encouraging us to think about this.
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In this  section,  we will  defend our  view that  counting  animals  in  war  will  not  result  in
military action invariably failing tests of proportionality and necessity. We do this on three
grounds. First, the epistemic demandingness is a contingent matter, and one readily remedied
by  rethinking  the  kinds  of  expertise  present  in  the  military.  Second,  killing  animals  is
frequently  going  to  be  comparatively  less  serious  than  killing  humans.  And,  third,  the
activities most likely to be harmful to animals are already ruled out by standard approaches to
just-war theory.
5.1: Military expertise and training
Counting animals in war may require us to rethink the people involved in decisions about
military activities, and perhaps the expertise that military commanders are expected to have.
International  humanitarian law—according to the First  Additional  Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions (1977: Art. 57)—already requires that soldiers take reasonable steps to limit
collateral damage. This could include deploying specialist technology or consulting experts to
determine (for example) whether civilians are present in an area. The same applies when it
concerns harm to animals. Counting animals in war may require that ethologists, ecologists,
and other specialists are consulted prior to acting. It may also mean that such specialists are
present full-time, and/or that military personnel receive training in this area. It may require
that military R&D involve (anthro)zoological research. For example, militaries will need to
engage in research to develop heuristics to weigh different harms to animals in the field. Such
heuristics,  which likely require input from ethologists,  philosophers,  and so forth, will  be
explored in greater detail in §5.2. Even if counting animals in war will not prohibit military
actions by making fighting justly overly demanding, it  will  call  on us to rethink military
practices—and not just in the field.
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We further  observe  that  the  epistemic  element  of  the demandingness  objection  to
counting animals in war raises many concerns that are ultimately no different in kind from
the problems faced in applying anthropocentric accounts of proportionality and necessity. As
argued in §2, assessing proportionality and necessity is an inherently uncertain affair, as it
deals  in  probabilities  and  estimates.  Thus—if  one  is  happy  to  allow  that  calculating
proportionality  and necessity  is  not  already too epistemically  demanding—we should not
worry about the fact that counting animals in war involves dealing in uncertainties.
One might object that while the uncertainties involved in counting humans in war and
counting animals in war are not different in kind, they are different in degree, and this to such
an extent that the epistemic element of the demandingness objection still holds. After all,
militaries are better  at assessing the likely human harms of their activities than the likely
animal harms. But this, again, is down to the kinds of people present in militaries and the
kinds of expertise that military commanders possess. Ecologists possess the skills to assess
and estimate the kinds and numbers of animals  in potential  combat locations;  ethologists
possess  the  skills  to  predict  the  impact  of  military  activities  on  animals’  ways  of  life;
anthrozoologists  possess  the  skills  to  predict  the  kind  and  numbers  of  animals  kept  by
particular human groups. Indeed, they may already have the relevant knowledge—or could
quickly acquire it  if militaries provided funding for studies of this sort and started hiring
zoologists to advise commanders and train officers. So while there is presently a difference of
degree  in the levels  of epistemic  demandingness  between counting humans and counting
animals in war, this is wholly contingent, and could be remedied if militaries took their duties
towards animals seriously.
5.2: Comparing human and animal lives
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Counting animals in war does not mean that the deaths of most animals carry as much weight
as the deaths of paradigmatic  humans.21 As argued in §3.1,  paradigmatic  humans have a
stronger interest in continued life than do most animals. Consequently, it is not the case that a
military action intended to save x human lives is,  ceteris  paribus,  disproportionate if  the
action is foreseen to seriously threaten x+1 animals. Nor do we think that a military action to
save x human lives is, ceteris paribus, necessarily disproportionate if the action is foreseen to
seriously threaten 5x animals. But we do hold that human and animal lives are in-principle
commensurable—that is, the strength of animals’ interests in continued life can be compared
to the strength of humans’ interests in continued life—meaning that there is  some level of
threat  to  animal  life  that  results  in  a  military  action  to  save x number  of  humans being
disproportionate or (if some less harmful alternative is available) unnecessary. As noted in
§5.1, heuristics could be developed to aid these calculations, with more practical rules-of-
thumb derived from these for decisions in the field. The development of these heuristics is far
from a solely philosophical endeavour, and so is beyond the scope of this paper. We can,
however, offer an indication of what these heuristics will look like.
First, these heuristics will offer means to assess the lives of particular animals relative
to those of paradigmatic humans. This could be complicated, if necessary according to the
vision of proportionality and necessity favoured, by the different “value” of lives (combatant
vs. non-combatant, friendly vs. enemy, etc.). This will offer, for example, the claim that x
elephant lives outweigh one human life; that y pig lives outweigh one human life; and that z
sparrow lives will outweigh one human life. Presumably, x > y > z—but the numbers may be
very  large.  We will  not  be  drawn on assigning numbers.  The heuristics  will  need to  be
21 The same point has been made in explorations of the justice of war on behalf of animals (Cochrane and Cooke
2016; Cochrane 2018: chap. 5; Hadley 2009). Due to the comparative strength of the interests of humans and
animals in continued life—Alasdair Cochrane and Steve Cooke argue—“it is hard to justify threatening the lives
of  humans  for  the  sake  of  the  lives  of  non-human  animals”  (2016:  116).  There  are  exceptions:  The
proportionality criterion could be met by actions that present only a small threat to human lives but act to save
animals with comparably large interests in continued life, or interventions to save an extremely large number of
animals.
24
This is an author-accepted version of a paper that is forthcoming in/was published in Social Theory and
Practice. It may differ slightly from the final version. For the published version, please see the journal.
calculated with attention to the level of personhood of the animals in question and the amount
of  good that  can  be  expected  in  their  lives,  as  per  the  discussion  in  §3.2.  As these  are
heuristics, matters will be kept relatively simple. For example, the heuristics are unlikely to
provide a way to weigh the life of one cow against another cow; though the prospects of
individual cows are what matter,  separating one cow from another is too fine-grained for
practical decision-making in warfare. Indeed, the heuristics would likely account for only a
relatively small number of “tiers” of animals. Perhaps, for the purposes of the heuristic, a
cow’s interest in continued life equals that of a goat, a deer, or a sheep (cf. Kagan 2019: 117-
119, 293).
Second, they will offer means to estimate how many animals will be killed as a result
of particular activities. Let us offer three examples: 1) The poisoning of a waterway could be
assumed  to  produce  x  amount  of  animal  death,  where  x  is  derived  by  multiplying  the
expected poison death rate of the particular poison used by an estimate of area poisoned. 2)
Small-arms combat could be assumed to produce y amount of animal death, where y is a
factor of, among other things, the number of combatants engaged in combat, the kinds of
weapons used, and the familiarity of the present animals with humans (as this will impact
whether the animals are likely to flee or remain in the area). This is thus a more complicated
calculation, but, crucially, these are all variables that are relatively easy to determine if the
right  experts  are  consulted.  3)  The  creation  of  refugees  could  be  assumed  to  produce  z
amount of animal death, where z is derived by multiplying the expected rate of abandonment
(based on analysis of previous conflicts or related anthrozoological research) by the estimated
number of domesticated animals in the population. Note that x, y, and z will differ depending
on, for instance, the kind of space in which fighting is taking place. Small-arms combat on
tundra is less harmful for animals than small-arms combat in dense jungle, because there are
fewer animals present in the former. Similarly, numbers of animals abandoned are going to
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depend strongly on the demographics of the refugee population. Subsequently, the results of
these calculations would then need to be multiplied, where appropriate, by a factor based on
the interest in continued life of the animals in question. The result could be a crude estimate
of the “human-death equivalence.”22
This need not be as complicated as it may sound. For example, the consideration of
tundra vs. jungle is unlikely to be one that even relatively senior military commanders will
ever need to make, and the deaths of less sophisticated animals (unless very large numbers
are involved) might be something that could be ignored when stakes are high; the deaths of a
small number of fish are not going to significantly impact the proportionality of a mission
saving dozens of civilians. And, naturally enough, well-designed heuristics will make things
simple for commanders,  and even simpler rules-of-thumb could be derived for use in the
field. (Recall that we are not offering the heuristics themselves, just indicating the sorts of
things they will take into account.) While designing the heuristics will be challenging, using
them should not be. And time can be taken to design usable and realistic rules.
The third element of the heuristics will concern suffering. Calculations for suffering
will look similar to those used to judge animal death, but they will not need to be combined
with  information  about  the complexity  of  the  animals  in  question—it  is  much easier  for
animal suffering to outweigh human suffering than it is for animal death to outweigh human
death.  Thus, these heuristics will  strongly counsel against actions that will result  in large
22 So, to take the first case, a hypothetical calculation might look something like this: Of a given river, we can
know that there are approximately 100 fish per 500 metre stretch of river. There are also approximately fifty
grazing mammals who drink from the river. We know of the poison we intend to use that it has roughly a 100%
lethality  for  small  animals,  such  as  fish,  and  a  60% lethality  for  medium-sized  animals,  such  as  grazing
mammals. Thus in poisoning an approximately 500 metre stretch of river, we can reasonably expect the deaths
of 100 fish and thirty grazing mammals. We have said that we will not be drawn on assigning any numbers, but
let  us  imagine,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  heuristic  puts  the  harm  of  death  for  a  typical  fish  is
approximately  0.01 that  of  a  paradigmatic  human,  and  the harm of death of  a  typical  grazing  mammal is
approximately 0.1 that of a typical human. (These numbers are inspired by the kinds of numbers used in Kagan
2019 for a different but loosely related purpose. Readers are invited to substitute other numbers or animals as
appropriate, and we reiterate that it would not be the job of philosophers to assign these numbers in any case.)
Based on these stipulated numbers, we can calculate that poisoning a 500 metre stretch of the river results in
deaths roughly equivalent to (100×0.01)+(30×0.1) = 4 humans. Different numbers assigned to grazing mammal
and fish lives, of course, would result in very different numbers. In the field, commanders could simply assume
that poisoning 500m of river = four human deaths.
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amounts of animal suffering, while not necessarily offering the same strong counsel against
actions that will result in large amounts of animal death. As per the discussion in §3.2, this is
appropriate.
5.3: Proportionality, necessity, and discrimination
As noted in §1, animals themselves are rarely the intended target of military interventions.
Consequently, many of those military activities that are most likely to harm animals will be
the kind of military activities that, at the same time, cause significant (side-effect) harm to
human non-combatants.  The just-war  criterion  of  discrimination requires  that  combatants
only attack military targets, and avoid attacks that are not aimed at a specific military target,
cannot be aimed at a specific military target, or have effects that cannot be limited to military
targets.23 The kinds of military activities most likely to harm animals are thus already open to
critique for being indiscriminate. Discriminate methods of warfare are better able to restrict
harm to intended targets and limit spillover harms to human non-combatants and animals. For
instance,  chemical  or  biological  warfare  could  affect  very  large  numbers  of  people  and
animals, and, once begun, is very difficult to control. Carpet-bombing and nuclear weapons
are highly indiscriminate, likely to directly harm humans and animals, combatants and non-
combatants alike. Many booby-traps are unable to discriminate between humans and animals,
just  as  they  are  unable  to  discriminate  between  combatants  and non-combatants.24 Thus,
highly  discriminate  methods  of  warfare  are  to  be  preferred  on  both  anthropocentric  and
23 This is also the legal definition of indiscriminate attacks: indiscriminate attacks are “of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction” (First Additional Protocol, 1977: Art.
51). In addition, as noted above, Article 57 of the First Additional Protocol also requires that foreseeable side-
effect harm is limited as much as possible, even if the attack itself is not classed as indiscriminate. This second,
precautionary requirement is also accepted by many just-war theorists. Michael Walzer (2006), for instance,
argues in defence of a “Double Intention” requirement, which requires combatants to take measures to avoid
foreseeable harm to non-combatants in addition to requiring them not to intend harm to non-combatants. For a
counterargument to Walzer’s position, see Abbate 2014. For the view that Walzer’s position is not strict enough,
see Schwenkenbecher 2014. 
24 In fact, in some of its only mentions of animals, international humanitarian law already prohibits the use of
animals as booby traps. These prohibitions are intended to protect humans, but clearly protect animals as well
(Nowrot 2015: 135–136).
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animal-sensitive proportionality and necessity grounds, as they are better able to restrict harm
to intended targets and limit spillover harms to human non-combatants and animals.
6: Case studies
We shall  close  by  demonstrating  that  counting  animals  in  war,  despite  not  being  overly
demanding,  will  change  the  assessment  of  the  proportionality  and  necessity  of  military
activities. Crucially, this change will not always be a “raising of the bar” in the sense that
military actions will be more difficult to justify. Counting animals in war can also suggest
changes in tactics, or even make action easier to justify.
6.1: Case study 1: Forest
A military force is aware that poorly equipped insurgents hidden somewhere in an area of
remote rainforest are moderately likely to attack to attack their base. The result of such an
attack would likely be the deaths of the insurgents as well as risk of death and injury to a
small number of the soldiers staffing the base. A similar outcome would likely result from
mobilising the soldiers to pre-emptively attack the insurgents: the death of the insurgents, and
risk of death and injury to a small number of soldiers. Assume that the military force has
concluded  that  a  series  of  bombardments,  which  would  likely  kill  the  insurgents  and
devastate the rainforest in the targeted area, would be a viable way to prevent such an attack
without any risk to their own soldiers.25
On an  anthropocentric  account  of  proportionality,  the  question  would  be  one  of
weighing two possibilities. The first is the expected deaths of the insurgents and the expected
indirect  harms to humans caused by the devastation  of remote rainforest—rainforests  are
globally important carbon sinks, meaning their destruction can make a serious contribution to
25 Forests become targets in wars against guerrilla forces, with government militaries clearing forest ground or
bombarding rebels in forests and thus seriously impacting ecosystems. Vivid examples are provided by the use
of Agent Orange, napalm, and “Daisy Cutter” bombs in Vietnam (Ramanathapillai 2013: 105–106).
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harmful global warming. This is what will come about if the soldiers decide to bomb the
forest. The second is the moderate (because there may be no attack at all) risk of the deaths of
the  insurgents  and very  (there  may be  no attack)  small  risk of  injury  and death  for  the
soldiers. This would be the result if they do nothing. Let us imagine that the harm of the
second slightly outweighs the harm of the first: the risk to the soldiers is sufficient to impose
near-certain death on the insurgents and impose indirect harm on other humans. This would
mean that bombardment could be proportionate on anthropocentric accounts.
Once we count animals, however, the destruction becomes much harder to justify. In
addition to the harms to humans—direct harm to insurgents, indirect harm to other humans—
bombing  will  result  in  the  immediate  death  and  suffering  of  animals  caught  up  in  the
destruction, as well as lingering death and suffering as a result of the destruction of habitat.
(And animals,  like  humans,  are  harmed  by climate  change.)  Thus,  animals—likely  large
numbers  of  them—will  have  their  most  important  interests  thwarted.  This  thwarting  of
interests,  we  contend,  would  be  enough  to  outweigh  the  human  interests  that  favour
bombardment. The question would cease to be a weighing of highly likely insurgent deaths
and slight indirect human harm vs. moderately likely insurgent deaths and not very likely
soldier death and suffering, on which the latter involves the slightly greater setting back of
interests.  It  would become a comparison of highly likely  insurgent deaths,  slight indirect
human  and  animal  harm,  and  very  high  levels  of  animal  death,  suffering,  and  habitat
destruction (if they bomb the insurgents) vs. moderately likely insurgent deaths and not very
likely soldier death and suffering (if they wait for the insurgents to attack). Here, it seems, the
former option contains the greater setting back of interests, even if many of those interests
happen not to be human interests.
We thus conclude that while anthropocentric accounts of proportionality will likely
permit bombing in  Forest, animal-sensitive accounts will not. Instead, combatants will be
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required to shoulder risks—either because they have to attack the insurgents on foot, or, more
likely, they have to risk the insurgents attacking the base—in order to reduce the impact of
their  fighting  on  animals.  What  this  demonstrates  is  that  counting  animals  in  war  will
sometimes result in the justificatory bar being raised, and otherwise acceptable tactics being
ruled out.
 
6.2: Case study 2: Penguins
A military wishes to deter invasion of an island inhabited by humans and penguins.26 Two
realistic  options present themselves,  both equal when it  comes to cost,  effectiveness,  and
other  relevant  factors.  One  will  see  fortification  of  an  area  of  coast,  making  landing
impossible.  The other will  see that area of coast covered by mines, meaning that anyone
landing there will be killed. Though human deaths are relatively unlikely if mines are used—
assume clear signposting—risk of death is foreseen. Mines, however, will result in little-to-no
harm to penguins. This is because these birds are too light to trigger the explosives, and so
can freely walk across minefields. The option of fortifications, though not threatening any
humans, will be catastrophic for penguins, as they will no longer be able to traverse areas
between their breeding grounds and their hunting grounds. This will see penguins starving to
death  when unable  to  fish,  and drowning when unable  to  land.  There  is  thus  a  genuine
conflict between human and animal interests: human interests favour fortification, penguin
interests favour mines.
Anthropocentric accounts of necessity would favour fortification, as this is a form of
deterrence that will not risk harm to humans. On our animal-sensitive account, however, a
different outcome will be favoured. It  may be  proportionate to cause this level of penguin
death and suffering to prevent an invasion of the island  if no other option exists, but, for
26 This example is inspired by the case of penguins on minefields on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. For 
discussion and a host of similar cases of animals living successfully in (de)militarised areas, see Pearl 2006.
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fortifications  to be  necessary,  the option has to be compared to other  available forms of
defence. As argued, the interests of animals—including penguins—in continued life is far
lower  than  the  interests  of  paradigmatic  humans  in  continued  life.  Thus,  it  will  take  a
comparatively high number of foreseen penguin deaths, ceteris paribus, to outweigh even one
possible human death. Nonetheless, it could be that this number of penguins are foreseen to
die,  and  thus  the  use  of  fortifications  is  unjustified.  What  is  more,  the  deaths  of  these
penguins  will  contain  much  suffering:  their  lives  are  disrupted,  and  they  face  death  by
starvation. While we have argued that animals’ interests in continued life are typically lower
than humans’, we have not argued that animals’ interests in avoiding suffering are lower than
humans’. The harms faced by the penguins cannot be dismissed lightly.
We thus conclude that, while anthropocentric approaches to necessity will favour the
use of fortifications  in  Penguins, animal-sensitive accounts will  favour the use of mines.
Consequently,  counting  animals  in  war  will  sometimes  result  in  surprising—even,
conventionally, questionable—tactics being justified over putatively innocuous approaches.
6.3: Case study 3: Gas
State  A  is  contemplating  a  humanitarian  intervention  to  stop  State  B  from engaging  in
relatively indiscriminate gas-based attacks targeting B’s rural populations. Given the military,
political,  and  social  situation  in  the  country,  humanitarian  intervention  risks  protracted
conflict between A and B’s forces, likely spreading to include urban environments.
On standard accounts of proportionality, the question would be one of weighing the
anticipated harms of the protracted conflict (mediated by the anticipated chance of such a
conflict occurring) against the anticipated harms of the ongoing gas attacks. Let us imagine
that—though it is a close-run thing—in this case, the anticipated harm to humans through
protracted infantry clashes outweighs the anticipated harms caused by continued gas attacks.
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Contrary to the expectations of our imagined critics, we contend that, in this case,
including animals in accounts of proportionality may make military intervention more likely
to be proportionate. We say this because the anticipated protracted clashes risk relatively little
harm  to  animals.  (Though  animals  may  occasionally  be  caught  in  crossfire,  small-arms
combat is not something particularly harmful to them.) On the other hand, the actions that the
humanitarians seek to avert—the use of gas in rural areas—will have a very high impact on
animals, due to the attacks’ relatively indiscriminate nature. Rural populations are likely to
live among and around many animals. These animals will be seriously adversely affected by
the gas attacks. If we take harms to animals likely to be caused by warfare into account when
calculating  proportionality  and  necessity,  we  should  also,  all  else  equal,  take  harms  to
animals likely to be averted by war into account in these calculations.27
 While anthropocentric accounts of proportionality and necessity speak against it, we
conclude  that,  in  Gas,  an  animal-sensitive  account  will  favour  intervention.  This
demonstrates that counting animals in war can make war easier to justify.
7: Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that, first,  the proportionality and necessity requirements in
just-war theory can be reformulated to consider harm to animals, and, second, that such a
reformulation  does  not  mean  that  the  requirements  become  overly  demanding.  Animal-
sensitive accounts of proportionality and necessity might sometimes require us to change our
tactics,  or  reconsider  some military  actions  that  might  be  considered  proportionate  on  a
human-centred account of proportionality. On the other hand, counting animals in war might,
in some situations, make it easier to justify military action.
27 To reiterate what was said in §1, some animal ethicists have already explored the case for waging war to avert
harms solely to animals—but we make no commitments on the subject here.
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The enquiry offered by this paper opens the door to two further research areas. The
first concerns just-war theory beyond necessity and proportionality. As noted in §1, a fully
articulated  animal-inclusive  just-war  theory  will  have to  consider  other  areas  of  just-war
theory, too. We have already noted, for instance, that some authors have considered whether
harm to animals can constitute a  just cause for war, and a further elaboration on this, and
other  ad bellum  criteria,  would be an important element of any animal-inclusive just-war
theory. The second new research area concerns developing the practical applicability of our
approach. We acknowledge that we have only tested the animal-inclusive approach in a small
number  of  hypothetical  cases.  Further  practical  development  would  entail  utilising  the
framework  with  close  attention  to  the  contingent  details  of  real-world  cases—aiming  to
provide concrete advice—or developing the kinds of heuristics and institutional proposals
pointed towards in §§5.1–5.2. It should be clear, however, that such practical developments
would require skills and knowledge that may not be possessed by philosophers. It would thus
need to be a genuinely interdisciplinary project.
This paper—in many ways, the first of its kind—shows that there is rich potential for
mutually enlightening exchange between just-war theory and animal ethics. Just-war theorists
should not fear their theoretical apparatus being upturned by the careful consideration of the
inclusion of animals, and animal ethicists need not fear that a consideration of just-war theory
must lead to unpopular conclusions about violence in defence of animals. Animal ethicists
should be ready to explore harms to animals in all contemporary environments, while just-
war theorists should be ready to explore the questions raised by the continued expansion of
our moral horizons.28
28 An early version of this paper was presented as part of the York Political Theory Workshop series. We thank
the audience for their comments, as well as both John Hadley and Bob Fischer, who offered us comments on
early  drafts,  and the peer  reviewers  and editors  at  the present  journal,  and other  journals,  who offered  us
constructive comments. Part of the work for this manuscript was undertaken while JM was a postdoctoral fellow
funded by the British Academy, grant number PF19\100101. JM offers thanks to the BA, the Department of
Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, and Alasdair Cochrane.
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